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This summary of the results of a comparative study of
three Central European countries with different privatisa-
tion patterns was prepared on the basis of the following
papers:
1. Evzen Kocenda, Juraj Valachy, Secondary Privatisation
in the Czech Republic: Changes in Ownership and Enter-
prise Performance in Voucher-Privatised Firms, CASE
Report No. 45, Warsaw 2001.
2. Marko Simoneti, Andreja Bohm, Joze P. Damijan, Boris
Majcen, Marko Rems, Matija Rojec, Secondary Privatisation
in Slovenia: Evolution of Ownership Structure and Compa-
ny Performance Following Mass Privatisation, CASE Report
No. 46, Warsaw, 2001.
3. Piotr Kozarzewski, Richard Woodward, Secondary
Privatisation in Poland (Part I): Evolution of Ownership
Structure and Company Performance in Firms Privatised by
Employee Buyouts, CASE Report No. 47, Warsaw 2001.
4. Barbara B³aszczyk, Micha³ Górzyñski, Tytus Kamiñski
and Bart³omiej Paczóski, Secondary Privatisation in Poland
(Part II): Evolution of Ownership Structure and Enterprise
Performance in Firms Privatised under the National Invest-
ment Fund Program, CASE Report No. 48, Warsaw, 2001.
5. Irena Grosfeld, Iraj Hashi, The Evolution of Owner-
ship Structure in Firms Privatised through Wholesale
Schemes in the Czech Republic and Poland, CASE Report
No. 49, Warsaw 2001.
This summary was prepared and edited by Barbara
Blaszczyk and Richard Woodward of CASE - the Center for
Social and Economic Research. In the project whose results
are presented here, our team investigated the phenomenon
of "secondary privatisation" (that is, the post-privatisation
evolution of the ownership structures established as the
result of initial privatisation) in three transition economies
(the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia) in the years
1995–1999. Our research covered companies that were
privatised under various privatisation schemes which estab-
lished ownership structures whose nature was heavily
determined by privatisation policy rather than market forces
(including employee buyout programs and mass privatisa-
tion programs in which all citizens were given rights to
acquire shares at prices significantly below market value).
We present the post-privatisation changes in ownership
structures of privatised companies and analyse the relation-
ships between those changes and the economic perfor-
mance of the companies. Much attention is also devoted to
the role of the institutional environment. We hope that the
results of this research will be useful for everyone interest-
ed in the little-researched question of what has happened to
companies after privatisation in the transition countries. 
Barbara B³aszczyk
Project Co-ordinator
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In the early stages of the transformation of the majority
of post-communist countries, various types of privatisation
schemes were applied in order to speed the process of pri-
vatisation of the state sector and ensure social support for
the privatisation process. In addition to classic commercial
privatisation methods "imported" from the West, these
schemes took the form of mass (voucher) privatisation and
management-employee buyouts. The common denomina-
tors were a high degree of state involvement in the creation
of various types of ownership institutions (e.g., investment
funds and various other types of funds – e.g., privatisation
funds, pension funds, employee holding companies, etc. –
which became shareholders in privatised companies) and
the definition by the state (to a greater or lesser degree)
of the ownership structures of privatised enterprises,
both by identifying future types of owners and, in some
cases, by determining what the proportions of shares held
by various types of owners were to be. As a result, in
countries where efforts were made to determine owner-
ship structures from on high, enterprises often found
themselves with identical ownership patterns immediate-
ly following privatisation, regardless of their size, the mar-
kets in which they operated, or other specific character-
istics. On the other hand, in countries where ownership
structures were allowed to arise in the initial stage
through processes more closely resembling market regu-
lation, observers were surprised to find that in many
cases highly insular ownership structures emerged in
which management was under relatively weak control
and access barred to outsiders.
The creators of schematic privatisation programs had
varying attitudes toward the problem of the further evo-
lution of ownership structures following the initial privati-
sation. Some countries have chosen a model of gradual
state withdrawal from its ownership role in the economy,
accompanied by strong state control of subsequent own-
ership evolution; others have preferred a more "sponta-
neous," unregulated approach. In both cases, we can
observe many surprises and unanticipated results.
In countries where the transformation process began
relatively early, we can speak of a "secondary" ownership
transformation process which is currently occurring (the
terms "primary" and "secondary privatisation" which we use
here are inspired by the analogy to primary and secondary
capital markets.) Following the primary privatisation, often
of a very administrative nature, many enterprises have
entered a stage of change in the ownership structure which
has been determined more by market forces and newer,
more sophisticated regulations. The observation of these
changes can provide us with important criteria for evaluat-
ing the degree of maturity of the systemic transformation of
those countries.
One can expect these secondary transformations to
occur in all privatised enterprises, since such changes rep-
resent an entirely normal characteristic of private firms in
market economies. Of particular interest, however, is the
question how these evolutionary processes are unfolding in
"schematically" privatised firms where the ownership struc-
ture was originally set – to a greater or lesser degree – by
the government. Can we observe any general trends or pat-
terns in these evolutionary processes, or are they varied?
Who are the owners emerging in the secondary ownership
transformation process? What factors determine the types
of secondary changes? How rapid is the pace of ownership
evolution? Under what conditions is it particularly rapid e.g.,
in cases of the appearance of a strategic investor? If the pace
of evolution is particularly slow, can we identify factors,
which are inhibiting it, as well as the sources of those fac-
tors? To what extent is state regulation or the government
itself the source of such inhibiting factors, and to what
extent are other actors – e.g., insiders – inhibiting the
process? What is the impact of the gradual liberalisation of
capital flows and the reform of financial sectors, in the con-
text of expected accession to the EU, on the pace and char-
1. Introduction and Rationale for the Research
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acter of secondary transformations? Do secondary owner-
ship transformations lead to changes in corporate gover-
nance (changes in management style or managerial staff) and
the intensification of restructuring efforts? Do they affect the
financial performance of the companies? 
Research attempting to answer these questions should
allow us to evaluate the degree of open-endedness of vari-
ous privatisation schemes – i.e., the degree to which they
allow for flexibility in adjustments of ownership structures
to the specific needs of individual firms. This was the central
research goal of this project. 
In the course of the project, additional research ques-
tions arose. One of the most important was the problem of
the mutual dependency of ownership concentration and
structure on the one hand and economic performance on
the other. Here, we are concerned primarily with the ques-
tion of the endogeneity or exogeneity of ownership struc-
ture (i.e., is ownership structure a factor determining eco-
nomic performance, or is it determined itself by perfor-
mance and the factors which determine performance?).
Another was the search for an efficient ownership structure
and corporate governance model. Finally, a very stubborn
question concerned the role of governmental and quasi-
state institutions in secondary privatisation and the influence
of the state’s policy on residual state property on the
process. 
Our attempts to answer all of these questions in our
research met with partial success. We were able to identify
the new owners emerging in privatised enterprises from the
secondary privatisation process in each of the three coun-
tries, as well as to observe the trends in evolution of own-
ership structure and the degree of concentration. More-
over, we were able to identify the factors behind this evolu-
tion which lie within the regulatory environment of the
companies. We built valuable databases for each of the three
countries, and these, in turn, allowed us to assess the eco-
nomic and financial performance of companies undergoing
secondary privatisation. However, the number of observa-
tions in these databases is too small (that is, the time series
are too short) for us to draw unambiguous conclusions con-
cerning the relationships between ownership evolution and
performance.     
Throughout the course of our research we sought a
common scheme for the analysis of all three countries. It
turned out, however, that we are unable to avoid the prob-
lems of path dependency and the resultant specificity of the
models applied and emerging in the various countries. Dif-
ferences in the corporate ownership and control structures
emerging across countries reflect both the specifics of the
various privatisation models which they applied and differ-
ences in their regulatory environments and macroeconomic
policies. For these reasons, our ability to make meaningful
international comparisons is impaired. Practical solutions for
secondary privatisation must therefore be sought at the
level of individual countries, in response to these specifics.
Nevertheless, international research like that presented
here provides for comparisons which are of great value in
the search for such solutions. 
Our research has proved that secondary ownership
transformations are an important and still insufficiently
researched aspect of enterprise adjustment as well as an
indicator of the flexibility and stability of the entire econo-
my. We hope that this direction of research will generate
sufficient interest to allow it to continue in the three Central
European countries we investigated and in other transition
countries. We believe that this research will provoke pro-
found international discussion, which in turn should lead to
formulation of policy recommendations, both for countries
in a more advanced phase of ownership transformations
(e.g., how to change regulations to allow for more flexibility
in secondary ownership transformation) and for countries
currently developing their own privatisation programs. 
The main objectives of the research were formulated as
follows:
1. Identify the "nature" of secondary ownership transfor-
mations of enterprises privatised under formalised privatisa-
tion schemes in three Central European countries, with par-
ticular focus on:
– the scope and pace of secondary ownership changes
and factor affecting them;
– trends in secondary ownership transformations (e.g.,
identification of types of emerging new owners);
– selection processes for agents involved in secondary
ownership transformation;
– barriers to secondary ownership changes, especially
those resulting from institutional factors and state regula-
tions;
– the effects of the regulation of primary privatisation
schemes on secondary privatisation processes, and
– the impact of pre-accession policies (especially the li-
beralisation of capital flows and the reform of financial sec-
tors) on the pace and character of secondary transforma-
tions.
2. Formulate and examine (using statistical methods)
hypotheses concerning:
– relationships between changes in economic perfor-
mance and primary and secondary ownership transforma-
tion;
– relationships between changes in corporate gover-
nance and secondary ownership changes, and
– the effectiveness of various privatisation schemes in
terms of their open-endedness.
3. Formulate a set of specific recommendations con-
cerning necessary changes in the area of regulations in par-
ticular countries and more general recommendations con-
cerning the utility of various alternative privatisation
schemes for other countries.  
2. Objectives of the Research 
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Three countries were included in the project: the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Slovenia. In each case empirical stud-
ies of the ownership changes that have occurred since pri-
vatisation in companies privatised by voucher (mass) privati-
sation and/or employee buyouts were carried out. These
were supplemented by analysis of the relationship between
performance and ownership changes. An effort was made
to ensure a maximum of methodological uniformity. How-
ever, this was not always possible. The approaches used in
the research are summarised below.
3.1. The Czech Republic
The data on Czech companies is a combination of data
sets on financial indicators, ownership characteristics and
employment of companies privatised in the two waves of
the voucher scheme. They were prepared by a Czech com-
mercial company (Aspekt) using official company accounts
filed by joint stock companies, the Prague Securities Centre
and company reports. The financial data are annual and cov-
ers the period of 1993–1999. The ownership data included
the identity and the equity holdings of up to seven of the
largest shareholders of each company since 1996. The own-
ers were categorised into six types: other industrial groups
or companies, investment funds, portfolio investors, individ-
uals, banks, and the state. 
The primary changes in ownership structure in the
1996–1999 period were first calculated using three owner-
ship concentration measures: the average percentage of the
equity owned by the single largest owner (C1), the average
percentage of the equity owned by five largest owners (C5),
and the Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration (H;
this is the sum of the squared shares of each owner). The
authors also calculated the mean ownership position for
each of the six categories of owners mentioned above, and
used density functions of ownership concentration indices
to paint a broader picture of ownership structure and its
changes during the period from 1996 to 1999.
To capture the relationships between the ownership
changes described above and various aspects of enterprise
performance, the authors carried out regressions employing
the ownership variables described in the foregoing as well as
financial indicators including profitability, sales and debt. The
performance variables were regressed on various owner-
ship variables as well as industry and sector dummies.
3.2. Slovenia
In their analysis of ownership changes in Slovenia, the
authors first presented the C1, C5, C10 and Herfindahl con-
centration indices for all mass privatisation companies at the
end of primary privatisation, and then the changes in those
indices which had emerged by 1999. Then, using for a sam-
ple of 183 mass-privatised companies, they presented the
weighted averages of shares of various types of owners
(state funds, investment funds, managers and employees,
domestic and foreign external investors) at the time of com-
pletion of primary privatisation and in 1999. 
To examine the relationship between ownership and
performance, data from financial accounts from the period
1995–1999 were used for 426 mass-privatised companies.
These companies were divided into groups depending on
whether they were publicly traded, owned primarily by
internal owners (management and employees), or owned
primarily by external owners (for the most part, state and
investment funds), and whether they had switched from one
of these categories to another. In their analysis the authors
were particularly interested in identifying what they called
owner effects (the performance effects of staying in one
ownership category) and agent/seller effects (the perfor-
3. Scope and Methodology of the Research
mance effects of moving from one ownership category to
another). Performance indicators used in this analysis
included the growth in labour force, sales and assets, and
productivity, and the ratios of operating profit, operating
profit increased by depreciation, and net profits to sales
revenues. 
Correcting for selection bias, the authors regressed
measures of performance on various factors not related to
the ownership structure which were thought to have an
impact on performance as well as dummy variables for dif-
ferent ownership groups of companies.
3.3. Poland – Companies Privatised by
Management-employee Buyouts
In this study, 110 firms privatised by the lease-leveraged
buyout method between 1990 and 1996 were analysed.
First, weighted averages of the shares of various groups of
owners (strategic investors, other domestic and foreign
external investors, and various groups of insiders) at the
time of privatisation and in 1997, 1998 and 1999, as well as
the evolution of C1 concentration, were presented and
analysed. 
In an attempt to analyse factors affecting ownership
changes generally, the authors considered trends in owner-
ship evolution by initial ownership structure, branch (indus-
try, construction, services, and trade), size (employment),
and profitability. In an attempt to gain some insight into the
relationship between ownership and the companies’ deve-
lopment prospects, the authors looked at various measures
of development-oriented activities, including investment
activity, expansion into new markets, etc., examining their
correlations with ownership variables.
Finally, corporate governance in the employee-owned
companies was examined, with special attention devoted to
the role and composition of the supervisory board and the
role of owners and top management in decision-making
process.
3.4. Poland – the National Investment
Fund Program
The data on the 512 companies in the National Invest-
ment Fund Program were collected from the Ministry of
State Treasury, the annual reports of NIFs and their portfo-
lio companies contained in the publication Monitor Polski,
and the reports of the Association of National Investment
Funds. For some of the companies that have been floated
on the stock exchange, further information was obtained
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
Ownership changes in the 1995–2000 period were
analysed by looking at how many companies in the NIFs’
portfolios were sold to what types of investors (i.e., domes-
tic corporate, domestic individual, employee, foreign, other
NIFs, public trading) in which years. The economic perfor-
mance of NIF portfolio companies was compared with
other groups of companies in Polish economy, and then the
group of NIF companies was broken down with respect to
type of owner that acquired (or kept) them, and these
groups compared with each other. The basis for compari-
son was annual sales.
A great deal of attention was also paid to the issue of
changes in the ownership of the funds themselves as well as
the issues of corporate governance in the funds.
3.5. Comparative Study: 
Czech Republic and Polish NIFs
The authors made a comparison of ownership develop-
ments in the Czech sample described above and in Polish
NIF companies. Like most of the other authors, they focused
on two aspects of the evolution of ownership: changes in
concentration and the reallocation of ownership rights
between various groups of owners (individual shareholders,
financial institutions, other companies, banks, state, etc.).
For the Czech Republic, they analysed the transforma-
tion matrix and a breakdown of the companies with respect
to concentration of less than 20%, 20–50% and over 50%.
For the NIF group, they made an analysis of the evolution of
the C1 concentration index, and then looked at changes in
the equity holdings of the state, NIFs, and various types of
investors (domestic corporate, domestic individual,
employee, foreign, other NIFs).
Finally, having shown that ownership structure of firms
included in the mass privatisation programmes in Poland
and in the Czech Republic has undergone significant
changes, the authors test several hypotheses concerning the
determinants of this evolution. 
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4.1. The Czech Republic
The years 1991–1995 were marked by an ongoing process
of voucher privatisation. Although in the Czech privatisation five
methods of ownership transfer were employed, almost 40% of
the property within the scope of "large" privatisation was priva-
tised through the voucher scheme. The scale of the voucher
program can be appreciated by examining the share of total
assets placed in it. The first wave of the voucher program inclu-
ded about 7.5% of the total country’s capital assets. The sec-
ond, somewhat smaller wave, was completed by the end of
1994 and accounted for about 4.5% of the country’s assets. An
additional illustration of the scope of the program is the fact that
988 firms out of the 2,404 firms in the first wave had some or
all of their shares allocated to the voucher program. The vast
majority of these firms distributed over half of their net worth
through vouchers, with an average of 61.4% of capital being
placed in the voucher scheme. The second largest share
(23.3%) was retained by the Fund for National Property (FNP).
Similar trends were observed in the second wave.
Thus, while it was only one of many possible methods of
ownership transfer, the voucher scheme in fact became one of
the most decisive factors of ownership distribution in the Czech
Republic.
Privatisation Investment Funds (PIFs) took an active part in
carrying out the voucher scheme. As a result of their participa-
tion the PIFs are among the most important owners of equity in
the Czech voucher-privatised firms. The funds represented the
most popular way for citizens to invest their vouchers in the
voucher privatisation. The founding institutions of the privatisa-
tion funds originated from a broad spectrum of different legal
bodies. A significant number of them were financial institutions
of various types, which are referred to as banks for simplicity’s
sake. The rest of the market with voucher points to be alloca-
ted to PIFs was within the domain of funds that were created by
other institutions. The majority of these institutions were ma-
nufacturing companies. 
More than 400 PIFs participated in the voucher scheme, and
the most successful ones were connected with existing financial
institutions. The 13 largest funds received more than 100 million
voucher points each, thereby obtaining control over 56% of all
points allocated to PIFs. Altogether, the first five largest PIF
founders captured more than half of the voucher scheme mar-
ket in the first wave and a little less in the second wave. The
immediate post-privatisation ownership structure of privatised
companies can shed some light on the role of PIFs in the
process. Out of 988 enterprises from the first wave, in 102 of
them the single largest PIF owned 20% or more of the shares.
The two largest funds owned 20% or more shares in 673 com-
panies, and the four largest funds held 40% and more shares in
about 400 companies. In comparison, foreign and domestic
strategic investors held 20% or more of the shares in 40 firms.
Foreign owners acting alone had a 50% share position in 19
companies. This tendency toward overwhelming fund domi-
nance decreased somewhat after the second wave of voucher
scheme, which was characterised by the funds selling many of
their shares to individuals and corporate entities. It seems that
the funds were implementing a strategy of liquidating excess
share holdings in order to create well-diversified, risk-minimis-
ing portfolios. 
The resulting ownership structure after both waves was
more or less an outcome of the logistics in the administration of
the voucher scheme. In 1995 changes in ownership also reflec-
ted regulations to prevent excessive stakes being held by pri-
vatisation funds. More economically meaningful patterns of
ownership structure began to emerge in the Czech companies
in 1996.
An important stage of ownership development during the
early post-privatisation period was nicknamed the "third wave of
privatisation". Here, heavy inter-fund trading rearranged the
PIFs’ portfolios. This was carried out under almost complete
lack of government intervention in the way of enforcement of
legal provisions and regulations. During this stage many funds
surpassed the 20% ceiling for shareholding in a single company.
In addition, in 1996 several investment companies found a legal
4. Research Output
way of circumventing the 20% shareholding cap by transform-
ing themselves into holding companies. Overall, the central fea-
tures of the "third wave" are the increasing concentration of
corporate ownership structures and the attempts of various
investors to build up large financial conglomerates.
The "primary" privatisation process brought companies out
of state ownership; however, lack of regulation created an
extremely soft management environment. As mentioned
above, since 1995 investment funds have started to reorganise
their portfolios, and a certain part of companies have undertak-
en the task of restructuring to become competitive. It was
argued that the presence of privatisation funds in the ownership
structure of a company is desirable up to a certain level of fund
involvement as a source of funds for financing restructuring.
However, too much proprietary involvement of a fund can have
a bad influence on a company, because profits are extracted
from the company rather than being used for investments and
eventual restructuring. Naturally, such behaviour is indicative of
weak corporate governance.
Another important problem, influencing the quality of cor-
porate governance of voucher-privatised firms, was the rela-
tively high margin of residual state property left after the com-
pletion of voucher privatisation in the Czech Republic. In
exchange for vouchers, the PIFs acquired shares in numerous
companies in which the state retained a share. Moreover, a
number of these funds were formed by financial institutions in
which the state has kept a large share. Thus, these funds invol-
untarily became to a certain extent institutional managers of the
residual state property. Apart from the residual state property
that is in reality managed by privatisation funds, the state still
maintains an important share in numerous joint stock compa-
nies. The most valuable portion of assets falls into the category
of 20 companies considered as strategic, in which the state
holds more that half (but less than three quarters) of the shares.
The relative book value of all companies in which the National
Property Fund has a share of over 50% represents a spectacu-
lar 41% of all assets in the state portfolio. If we take into
account additional means of control (golden shares, strategic
company status), then state control reaches 76% of the book
value of all companies in the portfolio of the National Property
Fund. One cannot but conclude that the state maintained its
influence over a significant part of the Czech economy in spite
of the voucher privatisation. Additionally, the state explicitly
excluded a certain amount of assets from privatisation. Thus,
the residual state property in the economy is partly the result of
the inefficiency of the privatisation process and partly the inten-
tional outcome of the refusal to carry out further privatisation.
In the years following the formal end of the voucher privati-
sation, the government did not initiate many changes for further
privatisation. Thus, the state has kept massive shares in the
already voucher-privatised companies. The privatisation of the
commercial banking sector has been one of the most positive
achievements of the period following voucher privatisation so
far and is well advanced at the time of writing.
A specific feature of the Czech voucher privatisation was
the collective investment opportunities offered by numerous
privatisation funds at the onset of the voucher privatisation
scheme. This scheme resulted in the distribution of enterprise
shares not amongst a large number of individuals, but amongst
a large number of privatisation investment funds. Specifically,
one third of the investment companies gained control of over
two thirds of the total enterprise shares obtained by all funds.
The lax legal environment and the absence of any notification
and disclosure requirements facilitated a wave of mergers and
acquisitions, which contributed to further concentration of
ownership. These mergers and acquisitions created an exten-
sive web of relationships. Concerns were raised about a finan-
cial oligarchy controlling a considerable part of the economy and
exercising undue influence over the market structure.
Under severe pressure from the public, the press and the
opposition parties, the government speeded up legislation
establishing the Securities Exchange Commission. Additionally,
the Czech National Bank has prepared new draft laws on the
banking system which will introduce new restrictions on the
ownership of banks and on the structure of their portfolio
investment. The government has also drafted the Law on
Investment Companies and Investment Funds, aiming to reduce
the maximum limit of a fund’s ownership of a company from
20% to 11% and, more importantly, preventing the represen-
tatives of investment funds from sitting on company boards.
Although these changes to the regulatory framework may solve
some of the problems of the existing system, they are also like-
ly to affect the system of corporate governance adversely.
A 1998 OECD report sums up this post-privatisation situa-
tion when it states that the Czech voucher approach to privati-
sation produced ownership structures that "…impeded efficient
corporate governance and restructuring." The essence of the
problem was that insufficiently regulated privatisation invest-
ment funds ended up owning large or controlling stakes in many
firms privatised by vouchers, as citizens diversified risk by
investing their coupon points in these funds. But most of the
large funds were owned by the major domestic banks, in which
the Czech state retained a controlling or even majority stake. 
Many conclude for these reasons that Czech firms priva-
tised through vouchers, in which investment funds hold the
controlling stakes, have not been sufficiently or persistently
restructured. Authors looking at financial performance in a set
of Czech firms concluded that while ownership concentration
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in hands other than those of the funds has a major (and positive)
effect on performance, there is no evidence of a positive effect
of ownership shares by funds on the performance of operating
companies. The proximate and most visible reasons of inade-
quate restructuring are weaknesses in capital and financial mar-
kets. On the other hand, the reason for failures in the voucher
privatisation method is the method itself, with its emphasis on
speed, its postponement of consideration of the legal and insti-
tutional framework aspects, and its atomisation of ownership. 
An analysis of changes in ownership structure and their
effect on firms’ economic performance pointed to a set of
essential outcomes. Results from the immediate post-privatisa-
tion period show that between 1996 and 1997 ownership con-
centration in a sample of the voucher-privatised companies gen-
erally increased and was, in comparison to many developed
countries, extremely high. The average single owner (C1) held
close to 39% of shares in a company in 1996 and more than
42% in 1997. The five largest owners (C5) held almost 58 and
62 percent of shares in these years, respectively. The highest
concentration was found among the domestic and foreign
strategic investors, the lowest among banks and portfolio invest-
ment companies. The largest increase in ownership concentra-
tion was recorded for the category of state ownership (!) and
domestic strategic investors, followed by investment funds and
non-bank sponsored PIFs in particular. Remarkably, the average
share ownership of the state was still very high (almost 35%)
and was mostly concentrated in such strategic industries as
energy, banking and utilities. The number of firms with foreign
strategic investors was still relatively low in 1996–1997. Since, at
the end of 1990s, the Czech Republic faced an accelerated
inflow of FDI, we can expect an increase in this group of firms,
perhaps crowding out state ownership to some extent. The
number of firms in which the PIFs had a share was very high in
1996 (566 companies – or almost the half of voucher-privatised
firms), but declined in the next year to 348, while the average
share of the PIFs rose from 31 to 34%. 
Further outcomes were derived for the years from 1996 to
1999. The ownership concentration in voucher privatised firms
was analysed with respect to different concentration levels. Sin-
gle largest owner was found as a decisive shareholder. It was
found that important changes in ownership concentration hap-
pened on three intervals that characterise the degree of owner-
ship. These are the intervals where a single largest owner holds
0–35, 35–63, and 63–100 percent of shares. During the relevant
period the largest changes in ownership concentration were
found in those voucher-privatised firms where single largest
owner held a stake of 15 to 35 percent of shares.
The overall change during years 1996–1999 can be charac-
terised by saying that only 40% of firms belonging to the first
interval in 1996 remained in this cluster through 1999. On other
hand, 53% of all firms belonging to the second interval
<35,63> in 1996 remained in this cluster through 1999, and
79% of firms that were in the third cluster in 1996 remained in
this category through 1999.
The changes in ownership structure were analysed by look-
ing at which of six types of owners (industrial companies, banks,
investment funds, individual owners, "portfolio companies"1, and
the state) was the largest shareholder in each of the companies.
In general, the highest average concentration increase between
1996 and 1999 was recorded for investment funds (50%) and
portfolio companies (40%) as single largest owners. A negligible
change was observed in case of banks (4% increase).
More detailed information about changes in the type of the
single largest owner between the years 1996 and 1999 can be
condensed in the following observations: Industrial companies
are the most stable type of largest owner, followed by individual
owners. The most unstable type of owner is the portfolio com-
pany. Only 5% of firms owned by portfolio companies in 1996
had the same single largest owner in 1999. Industrial companies
recorded by far the largest ownership gains in this period.
Based on the sector division made by the Prague Stock
Exchange (19 industry categories), the authors conclude that
the firms did not exhibit excessive ownership differences with
respect to sector-specific attributes in 1996. This outcome is dif-
ferent in 1999, when such sector-specific features are present
for five categories. Further, the authors observe that in their
sample, firms concentrate into five sectors: construction and
building materials, mechanical engineering, trade, services, and
investment funds. These five sectors cover about 60% of all
firms in 1996 and 1999.
In an econometric analysis of performance a broad set of
financial variables was defined in order to capture different
aspects of performance. These included profitability, strength
and size of the firm, its financial position, and its scope of business
activity. Moreover, in order to analyse the effect of the type of
owner on a firm’s performance, the models incorporated two
types of dummy variables, one for five different categories of
owners, and one for the total share of owners from each of the
six aforementioned categories in a given firm. Based on pre-test-
ing procedures, the authors adopted a random effects model.
1This term refers to a category of owners whose strategy is solely to realise profits through dividend payments or, more frequently, through capi-
tal gains and who normally do not have ambitions to participate in corporate governance.
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The authors concluded that ownership concentration does
not explain changes in company performance. Further, no
industry sector was found to have a specific effect with respect
to performance. Using a random effects model, they found that
if the single largest stake is held by a portfolio company the
change in total and fixed assets, gross operating profit/sales, and
operating profit is higher than in other cases2, where coefficients
were insignificant. In addition, firms where an individual is the
single largest owner exhibit higher growth of sales of own pro-
duction. No evidence of an effect of a specific type of owner
was found for two other performance criteria: value added/staff
costs and cash flow/equity.
4.2. Slovenia
After prolonged debates about how to privatise companies
in Slovenia, a compromise model was adopted, which in princi-
ple allowed for paid and non-equivalent (i.e. mass) privatisation.
The basic model of privatisation (20% + 20% +20% + 40%)
according to the Ownership Transformation Act (OTA) envis-
aged:
1. Transfer of 20 percent of shares to para-state funds: 10
percent to the pension fund and 10 percent to the restitution
fund.
2. Transfer of 20 percent of shares to privately managed pri-
vatisation funds in exchange for ownership certificates collected
by them from citizens.
3. Exchange of 20 percent of shares at favourable terms for
ownership certificates of internal owners (managers, current
and former employees).
4. Optional use of 40 percent of shares: 
(4i) for buyouts at favourable terms by internal owners, 
(4ii) in exchange for ownership certificates of citizens in
public offerings, 
(4iii) in exchange for ownership certificates collected by pri-
vatisation funds or 
(4iv) for purchases by strategic owners.
Since the latter part of the privatisation model was optional,
it had the potential to lead to the emergence of differing own-
ership structures, adapted to the needs of individual companies.
However, the legal principle of autonomy, by which managers
and employees were granted the right to prepare privatisation
plans, was a factor that critically determined the selection of pri-
vatisation options and led to domination of the entire process
by the "insider model".
Thus, companies usually did not opt for sales of shares to
strategic owners (4iv). Of approx. 1,500 companies, which
were privatised under the OTA, only a few dozen acquired
strategic owners. Thus, primary privatisation was a lost oppor-
tunity for numerous companies in troubles that required strate-
gic investors for restructuring. Secondary privatisation repre-
sents an opportunity for such companies to find them. The
owners that emerged from mass privatisation are largely transi-
tional owners that play a role of privatisation agents in search for
strategic investors.
The second characteristic of selection of privatisation
options was that managers and employees in general exercised
their priority buyout right to 40 percent of shares at favourable
terms (4i) to the maximum extent that their financial resources
allowed. Residual shares were either exchanged for certificates
collected by privatisation funds (4ii) or directly distributed to cit-
izens in public offerings (4ii). Thus, apart from privatisation to
insiders (i.e., internal privatisation) and privatisation to funds
(i.e., external privatisation), privatisation to citizens (i.e., public
privatisation) acquired significance in large and capital-intensive
companies. The choice between external and public privatisa-
tion was made on the basis of judgements as to which of the
two options represented a lesser threat to internal owners.
Obviously, initial public offerings were not an option in poorly
performing companies, whereas the privatisation funds were
forced to accept the shares of such companies.
As a consequence, three typical groups of companies were
formed, according to the relative importance of the three forms
of privatisation and in view of the statutory rules that applied at
the commencement of secondary privatisation: 
a) public companies quoted on the stock exchange as the
result of combined internal, external and public privatisation; 
b) non-public internal companies not quoted on the stock
exchange, with employees holding majority stakes, and 
c) non-public external companies not quoted on the stock
exchange, with employees and funds holding comparably large
shareholdings.
Privatisation in Slovenia was decentralised on both the sup-
ply and demand sides, and in principle a wide spectrum of
options was made available by the privatisation law. Neverthe-
less, in practice, that model limited the selection of privatisation
methods on both sides. Of 1,386 companies that underwent
mass privatisation less than one tenth (albeit the largest ones)
2 This is not so surprising, given that a portfolio company is the most unstable owner, as mentioned earlier. Consequently, they have strong incen-
tives to produce profits in short time. On the other hand, individual owners are one of the most stable groups, and may therefore be focusing on more
future-oriented tasks such as sales growth.
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used public offerings and are quoted on the stock exchange. All
public offerings were oversubscribed, some of them by several
hundred percent. The majority of citizens, however, invested
certificates in companies (as their current and former employ-
ees) and in privatisation funds (all of which were quoted on the
stock exchange). 
Mass privatisation was formally completed at the end of
1998, but has actually remained incomplete on both the
demand and supply sides. The portfolio of the state holding
company (Slovene Development Corporation-SDC) consisted
of a few hundred companies that were excluded from mass pri-
vatisation at its early stage, voluntarily for prior restructuring or
compulsorily within the state-led rehabilitation of two dominant
banks. On the demand side, substantial portions of certificates
remained unused in the portfolios of privatisation funds (they
represent the so-called privatisation gap). 
There was a wide agreement that the success of mass pri-
vatisation would ultimately depend on the speed and success of
restructuring at the micro level. The argument that the ensuing
concentration of diffuse ownership and consolidation of control
would serve as a prelude to the entry of strategic investors to
companies and their access to external financing to ensure such
restructuring pointed to difficult trade-offs. Whereas mass pri-
vatisation was state-administered, it was argued that secondary
privatisation should be essentially market-driven. For that rea-
son the market would have to be appropriately regulated, and
questions arose as to whether the standard Western regulations
were adequate for the purpose and whether they actually
would not hinder the speed of secondary privatisation and invite
fraudulence in its course. 
The authors argue that the ownership and control struc-
tures created in mass privatisation are sub-optimal for strategic
management and restructuring of companies and will have to
undergo profound changes in secondary privatisation.
Factors that prevent fast, transparent and effective sec-
ondary privatisation stem from the legal and regulatory frame-
work of capital markets and companies, i.e. the corporate gov-
ernance and finance regime that was established in mass privati-
sation and is perpetuated in post-privatisation due to the slow-
ness of the legislative and regulatory process. The legal and reg-
ulatory framework adopted to guide secondary privatisation
postpones transferability of large volumes of shares and applies
standard rules for ownership concentration and consolidation of
control to all privatised companies with tradable shares,
although only a fraction of them are quoted on the stock
exchange. Introduced on the basis of flawed assumptions and
presented as protection of small shareholders, such restrictions
and rules hinder taking private companies and privatisation funds
in an orderly fashion. They are evidently abused in practice,
while rules for voting on legal changes and reorganisations of
corporations (which in the given conditions may be a better pro-
tection of small investors), have not been established. As many
companies (as well as privatisation funds) ought to be taken pri-
vate, a systemic solution to that effect is required.  
The regulatory and legislative process lacks sensitivity
regarding the specific ownership and governance deficiencies
concerning the three ownership groups of companies and
awareness of the need to regulate and facilitate different routes
of secondary privatisation. To that effect, different forms of con-
solidation of diffuse employee ownership and different routes of
transformation of privatisation funds ought to be allowed, regu-
lated and facilitated. Moreover, secondary privatisation depends
directly on the manner of privatisation of residual state proper-
ty (including the exit of para-state funds as owners or financial
investors from companies), and indirectly on the manner of pri-
vatisation of public utilities and financial institutions.
The empirical analyses show that the first phase of sec-
ondary privatisation failed due to limited (foreign) competition,
low transparency and low speed. Moreover, problems emerg-
ing from primary privatisation as well as regulatory failures in
other areas in Slovenia have led to a waste of the momentum
for fast and orderly secondary privatisation and made the search
for solutions in secondary privatisation even more cumber-
some. 
The second part of the paper examines the data on evolu-
tion of ownership structures and concentration following mass
privatisation in Slovenia. Companies are grouped according to
the prevailing privatisation model into public, internal and exter-
nal. Public companies are traded on the stock exchange, in non-
public internal companies internal owners dominate over exter-
nal owners (mostly privatisation funds and para-state funds),
while in non-public external companies the situation is reversed.
Internal and external companies are not traded on the stock
exchange, and the consolidation of ownership in these two
groups is therefore less transparent than in public ones.
The data reveal that between the completion of privatisa-
tion and the end of 1999 almost 40% of initial shareholders have
already exited companies privatised through mass privatisation.
Ownership concentration was strengthened in all groups of
companies, but most intensively in internal companies. At the
end of 1999 ownership concentration is relatively high in all
groups of companies: the five largest owners on average hold
61.5% percent of the votes in mass privatised companies. It
seems that the principal-agent relationship between managers
and shareholders is less of a problem than the conflict between
large and small shareholders. Moreover, in Slovenia large share-
holders are para-state funds and privatisation funds, both lacking
the ability and motivation for proper corporate governance. On
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the other side, many small shareholders are company insiders
who act as a homogeneous group vis-à-vis external owners. It
might well be that with concentration of ownership in the per-
iod 1994–1999 the problem of managerial discretion was
reduced, while the conflict of interest between internal and
external owners has become worse.
Small shareholders, the state and para-state funds are
reducing their ownership stakes in the companies from mass
privatisation, while managers and strategic investors are increas-
ing them. It is observed that both of the latter groups are accu-
mulating their shares more intensively in companies not traded
on the stock exchange. Therefore, transactions are made on
informal markets with limited competition and transparency. In
addition, new strategic investors appearing through the end of
1999 are almost exclusively of domestic origin. Initial privatisa-
tion, with free distribution of shares and limited foreign and
strategic investors, is followed by non-transparent domestic
consolidation of ownership, where domestic companies, man-
agers and funds are the key players. A more intensive entry of
foreign portfolio and strategic investors in privatised companies
can be expected only later, in the course of accession of Slove-
nia to the European Union. On the basis of available data the
overall assessment of the post-privatisation ownership consoli-
dation in Slovenia is that the major problems are quality and
transparency of the process rather than its low speed.
The authors argue that in mass privatisation schemes, in
general, initial ownership structures were intended to be tran-
sitional, with optimal ownership structures emerging gradually
as a result of secondary transactions. Therefore, they suggest
that the success of mass privatisation should be judged by its
"agent/seller" effect, i.e. considering if temporary owners sell
fast and successfully to other owners (primarily to strategic
owners). The success of secondary sales is hence not to be eva-
luated by the achieved price but by the recognition, how suc-
cessfully companies perform after the sale to new owners. 
The econometric results presented in the study indicate
that secondary privatisation has had practically no positive
effect either on economic efficiency or on financial perfor-
mance in the 1995–1999 period in Slovenia. The analyses by
individual privatisation models, individual years and for the
whole period did not render any different results. The authors
concluded that this confirmed their earlier hypothesis that
improvements cannot be expected by acceleration of sec-
ondary privatisation only, and that the prime problem of sec-
ondary privatisation is related to its quality, whereas slow
speed is only a secondary problem.
4.3. Poland
In Poland, the two privatisation paths that may be classified
as "schematic" or "wholesale" were the employee buyout
method in the framework of direct privatisation and the Nation-
al Investment Funds Program. Two separate studies of each of
these programs have been prepared, because the two schemes
differ significantly from each other and deal with two different
groups of companies. Why do the authors treat EBO privatisa-
tion as a wholesale scheme, despite the fact that it was a bot-
tom-up privatisation procedure, initiated by the managers and
employees themselves? The authors do so because the legal
framework for this method was highly regulated by the govern-
ment and fairly strict criteria concerning the structure of own-
ership had to be met (specifically, it was required that at least
50% of the employees of the state enterprise become share-
holders in the new company). Also, the preferences given for
insiders in this type of privatisation influenced the lease/sale con-
tracts to a great extent. For these reasons, the ownership
effects of this privatisation probably diverged considerably from
the ownership structures that would have emerged without
government regulation, supervision and preferences. On the
other hand, it should be noted that this privatisation path
required much organisational and financial input from the buy-
ers and differed considerably in this respect from give-away
methods. More importantly, the ownership structures estab-
lished by this procedure were simple and did not include the
artificial construction of the mass privatisation schemes.
4.3.1. Employee-leased Companies in Poland
The vast majority of employee buyouts in the Polish privati-
sation process have been generated via the leasing variant of
direct privatisation, therefore, they will be often referred to as
employee-leased companies.
In the leasing variant of direct privatisation, at least 50 per-
cent of the employees of the state enterprise being liquidated
must form a company to lease the assets of the enterprise.
Moreover, no corporate investors or foreigners were allowed
to participate in the absence of special permission from the pri-
vatisation ministry. For this reason such companies are com-
monly referred to in Poland as "employee-owned companies".
By 31 December, 1998, 51.1 percent of all ownership transfor-
mations were conducted under direct privatisation3 and the
lease-leveraged employee buyout represented about one third
3 As of 31.12.1998, 2966 state enterprises had completed either privatisation or liquidation, with 240 cases of indirect privatisation, 512 firms trans-
ferred to the National Investment Funds, 1515 cases of direct privatisation and 699 Article 19 liquidations.
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of the completed privatisation cases carried out under the
supervision of the privatisation ministry4, thus constituting the
single most frequently used method. It is important to note that
this privatisation method was intended by Polish legislators to be
applied in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises, and
for the most part this has been the case in practice. Most of the
firms in this category are small- to medium-sized firms, usually
with less than 500 employees. 
The ownership structure of Polish employee-leased compa-
nies, especially immediately after privatisation, was charac-
terised by large holdings of dispersed insider owners. From the
very beginning, employee leasing has been the most "employee-
oriented" privatisation path, in terms of ownership structure.
Immediately following privatisation, insiders possessed, on the
average, 92 percent of the shares in the sample of employee-
leased companies, and in 95 percent of those companies, insid-
ers owned over 50 percent of the shares.
Subsequently, the shares of non-managerial employees
gradually decline, while those of outsiders grow. In employee-
leased companies, the share of non-managerial employees in
ownership has steadily decreased, from 58.7 percent imme-
diately after privatisation to 31.5 percent in 1999. It is worth
noting, however, that despite widespread selling of their shares
by non-managerial employees, by 1999 only in 6 percent of
firms had this group of owners vanished completely. In most
companies, non-managerial employees retained minor blocks of
shares at least. Often, those blocks were very small: in 17 per-
cent of the companies they did not exceed 10 percent, and in
almost half of the companies (43 percent) non-managerial
employees did not have blocking capabilities at shareholders’
meetings (at least 25 percent of the votes). Because of the dis-
persed character of these blocks of shares, in practice the vot-
ing capacity of non-managerial employees is even weaker than
these numbers indicate. If we assume that this group would
need at least 50 percent of the shares in order to block certain
decisions at a shareholders’ meeting, then it is clear that in at
least 76 percent of the companies under review, non-manager-
ial employees lack decisive influence on the decision-making
process as owners.5
While non-managerial employees were losing their shares,
the number of shares in the hands of outsiders increased fivefold
(from 7.6 percent to 38.5 percent). Almost all of them are
domestic investors; only three firms in the sample have foreign
investors (in two cases, strategic investors). A large portion of
the outsider shares represent concentrated holdings: 44.4 per-
cent of the outsider shares were held by owners whom respon-
dents referred to as strategic investors. There is also a large
group of private firms and entrepreneurs (18.7 percent). 
However, the second largest group of outsider owners con-
sists of unidentified "others" (34 percent of outsider shares).
One might hypothesise that this group consists mostly of former
employees of the companies who lost their jobs due to layoffs,
retired, or left for other reasons. 
Concentration of shares in the hands of managers can be
seen from the very moment of privatisation. Later, however,
managerial holdings stabilise and even decrease somewhat in
favour of outsiders.
The sample of employee-leased companies is gradually
becoming more and more heterogeneous. We observe three
chief directions of ownership structure changes:
– perpetuation of a dispersed shareholding structure, with
dominance of insiders (an approximation of an egalitarian, work-
er co-operative ownership structure);
– consolidation of ownership in the hands of insider elites;
– concentration of ownership in the hands of outside
investors.
In general, however, change is incremental. Radical changes
in the ownership structure are rare, and ownership structure
seems to be fairly inert. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to
conclude that significant change is not possible when it is in the
interests of the incumbents, as new strategic investors had
appeared in about 10 percent of the sample by 1998. (It is, how-
ever, worth noting that there is a negative relationship between
the size of top management’s share and the appearance of
strategic investors; it appears that once managers have decisive
control over the ownership structure of a company, they are
reluctant to relinquish it.)
A number of factors which influence the direction and the
dynamics of ownership changes, among others sector affiliation,
company size, initial ownership structure, etc., but the most
important is the economic condition of the company, which,
when it is poor, favours concentration and "outsiderisation" of
ownership (as well as changes in corporate governance). Man-
agement ownership on the average appears in relatively small
companies, while strategic investors appear in companies
whose average employment is above the sample average. This
is probably due to the fact that, given low levels of personal sav-
ings at the beginning of the transformation, it was more difficult
for an individual or small group of individuals to buy a large block
of shares in a large company than in a small firm.
Post-privatisation ownership transformations were achieved
not only by trade in existing shares but also by issues of new
4 Since about 66 percent of the direct privatisations were leasing cases. See Central Statistical Office (1999), 31.
5 Of course, they can influence decision-making in other ways, for example, through trade unions, workers’ protests, etc. However, analysis shows that
the situation in almost all employee-leased companies is largely free of conflicts, with trade unions passive and even – in many companies – ceasing to exist.
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ones. Nineteen firms had carried out new share issues by mid-
1997. Most frequently, new share issues serve to promote con-
centration of shares (especially in the hands of management and
strategic investors).
Access to credit and company size seem to be the most sig-
nificant determinants of investment spending. Very surprisingly,
the presence of strategic investors seems to be unrelated to
investment spending. Many firms in the sample refrain from
making dividend payments, but there is no indication that this
leads to increased investment and may simply be a result of abus-
es by management. There is some evidence that concentration
of shares in the hands of management is positively related to
investment, while the evidence concerning the relationship
between the share of non-managerial employees and invest-
ment is ambiguous. There appears to be no relationship
between ownership structure and marketing activity or expan-
sion into new markets (the former is most strongly related to
company size, and the latter to the branch in which the compa-
ny is operating). However, companies with strategic investors do
much better than others in the area of ISO quality certification.
There is (very) slight evidence that the extent of non-man-
agerial employees’ share in the ownership of the firm had a neg-
ative effect on economic performance in the early 1990s. In par-
ticular, there is a case – albeit a weak one – to be made for the
claim that companies whose employees constitute the domi-
nant owners follow a policy favouring consumption (wages, div-
idends and the like) over investment and development. How-
ever, the situation in the companies is likely to be differentiated,
with the character of relationships between ownership struc-
ture and economic decision-making dependent on many fac-
tors, which the authors were unable to analyse here.6 An exam-
ple of such differences is found in the opinion encountered by
one of the authors of this paper in case studies of Polish emp-
loyee-owned companies, according to which the most con-
sumption-oriented attitudes are exhibited by former employ-
ees. One of the company presidents expressing this opinion
about former employees also said that he regretted the fact that
new employees were unable to acquire shares in the company,
since such employees (young, well-educated persons hired in
the 1990s) are often the most valuable in the firm. From this
point of view, it is possible that employee-owned companies in
Poland could gain certain advantages from the creation of trust
funds, which would hold employee shares on behalf of the
employees, issuing shares to new employees and purchasing
them from those that leave the company. Such a mechanism
might resemble, for example, the Employee Stock Ownership
Plans of the United States.
Turning to issues of corporate governance, the authors con-
clude with a brief look at executive boards and supervisory
boards.
The membership of the executive boards is dominated by
persons who had managed the companies before privatisation,
when they were still state enterprises. The reproduction of
elites is more frequently halted in firms in which over 50 per-
cent of the shares are in the hands of outsiders than in the "insid-
er" firms, especially those in which the majority of shares belong
to non-managerial employees.
When viewed over a longer period of time, the evolution of
the composition of the supervisory boards has not been unidi-
rectional. Contrary to what one might expect in view of the
process of ownership "outsiderisation", the position of insiders
measured by numerical dominance in the composition of differ-
ent boards was markedly strengthened in 1998–1999. In com-
panies belonging to the employees, institutional control is
increasingly concentration of in the hands of insiders, while in
the "outsider" companies their employees are more and more
often allowed to participate in the organs of corporate gover-
nance. Moreover, when we look at the evolution of superviso-
ry board composition, we see evidence of increasing represen-
tation of stakeholders on this body. 
The supervisory boards did not use all the powers they
were given, at least during 1998–1999. The use of these pow-
ers depends not only on the character of the board, but also on
the company’s need for such actions. For example, it can be
assumed that all supervisory boards are active in reviewing
financial documents, statements, etc., while, as a rule, their par-
ticipation in appointing and dismissing the executive board,
approving large transactions, etc., occurs much more rarely.
Extension of the supervisory boards’ activities is observed
most frequently in companies in economic distress. Interrela-
tionships between the ownership structure and the extension of
the supervisory boards’ powers are of a more complex nature.
Lack of any dominant owners’ group is linked to extension of the
supervisory boards’ activities to the organisational sphere and to
the control over the capital and the firm; dominance of emp-
loyee ownership is linked to the board’s "social" activity and con-
trol over the firm’s assets, and dominance of the managerial staff
in the ownership structure is, in general, not accompanied by any
6 We must remember that each firm in fact constitutes a complex social organism, and the number of groupings and factions is probably propor-
tional to the number of employees. For a clear and comprehensive picture of the decision-making process in such firms, we probably need an in-depth
sociological analysis which would reveal the differences among such groups as current and former employees, new and old employees, white-collar and
blue-collar employees, employees of various departments and divisions, etc.
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extension of the supervisory board’s powers, except to the area
of finance. Generally speaking, the small role of owners in the
decision-making process is striking. The owners most frequently
act as decision makers where ownership is concentrated in the
hands of a strategic outside investor. The role of owners in deci-
sion-making also grows in loss-making companies (at the
expense of the powers of the executive and supervisory boards).
4.3.2. National Investment Founds 
Program in Poland
Our research on the factors behind, and effects of, the own-
ership evolution of the National Investment Funds (NIFs) and
their portfolio companies was concentrated in four areas:
– the changes in the ownership structure of the funds and
their concentration;
– the management of the funds (with a focus on corporate
governance and management costs);
– the strategies of the funds, especially their privatisation
efforts; 
– the changes in the ownership structure of the portfolio
companies and the trends in their performance.
The analysis presented in the first part of this paper showed
significant shifts in the ownership of the funds in the stage of sec-
ondary privatisation and a strong tendency to ownership con-
centration of shareholdings. The share of the State Treasury and
small investors decreased significantly, in contrast to the increas-
ing share of institutional domestic and foreign investors and
cross-holdings between the NIFs. 
At the beginning of the NIF Program (in 1995), the State
Treasury (representing the owners of Certificates of Ownership
– COs) was the main shareholder of the funds and fully con-
trolled them. Its ownership share started to decrease when the
process of exchanging COs for NIF shares began. The share of
the State Treasury decreased significantly at the end of 1998,
when the validity of the COs expired. As of the beginning of
1999, the state continued to hold only shares corresponding to
certificates not redeemed by the citizens and shares reserved
for remuneration of the management firms. Since that time, the
ownership share of the state in the NIFs has continued to
decrease and the Minister of the State Treasury has started to
play a passive role in the funds. As a result, by the beginning of
2001 the state’s share amounted to 13.4%.
The second important point is the decreasing share of small
institutional and  individual investors7 who at the beginning of the
program owned 85% of the total NIFs’ shares. After the com-
pletion of the exchange process, at the end of 1998 these
investors owned almost 50% of the total shares of the NIFs. By
the beginning of 2001, the share of small and individual investors
had dropped to 41% – less than half of its original level.
While the share of the State Treasury and small investors in
NIFs has been decreasing, the share of institutional and large
investors has been rising. The share of institutional investors,
starting at 0% in November 1995, jumped to 46% by the end
of 2000. Analysing the shareholdings of large investors, the
authors have observed that foreign investors are the chief group
responsible for the rapid increase in the involvement of large
investors in the Program. In June 1998, foreign investors had
only 2.5% of the shares of NIFs, but by January 2001, they had
more than 26% of the shares, which constituted 57.5% of the
total shareholdings of large investors. At the same time the
shareholdings of Polish investors increased much less significant-
ly. In June 1998, Polish investors held 4.1% of the NIF shares,
and in January 2001, they held only 13.5%. Analysing the share-
holding of large investors, the authors also observe the increas-
ing involvement of other NIFs. As of the end of 2000, almost
6% of NIF shares were owned by other NIFs. All the observed
trends – the decreasing share of the State Treasury and small
investors, the increasing share of institutional domestic and for-
eign investors and the growth of cross-holding relations among
the NIFs – reflect progressing ownership concentration. 
Over a period of 2.5 years (from June 1998 to December
2000) the C1 index (that is, the share of the single largest share-
holder) increased from 5.41% to almost 24%, and the C3 index
(the share of the three largest shareholders) increased from
almost 7% to 42%. the authors’ analysis thus demonstrates the
impressive pace at which the ownership concentration of the
NIFs is progressing. As of the end of 2000, just four years after
NIFs’ quotation on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and two years
after the State Treasury lost its majority stakes in the NIFs, all
NIFs achieved a concentration level8 and ownership structure
ensuring full and stable control over the funds. As a result,
opportunities for new entries into the NIFs are practically limit-
ed to portfolio investments. Any investors interested in acting as
large and active players on the NIF share market will have to buy
blocks of shares from other large investors who are already
playing that role. 
The main institutional investors on the NIF share market can
be divided into two groups. The first group includes the largest
institutional investors, who are interested in controlling the funds.
The second group includes the most active portfolio investors.
7 Small investors are defined as investors who own less than 5% of the shares in a single NIF.
8 That is, one in which one large investor owns 30–40%, given the dispersed character of other shares.
As of the end of 2000, the three most active investors were
domestic financial groups (two banks and one insurance compa-
ny) who had directly or indirectly gained control over 11 funds.
The remaining four funds are controlled by foreign investors.
Analysing the concentration process on the NIF market, the
authors hypothesise that the main incentive driving it consisted
in the profits that the funds’ shareholders derived from manage-
ment contracts between the management firms controlled by
those shareholders and the funds themselves. The very high
management fees paid to the management firms consumed a
significant part of the funds’ financial base, reaching during the
years 1997–2000 as much as 50% of the entire market value of
their assets. Investors obtained the lucrative management con-
tracts by first achieving shareholdings which gave them domi-
nant position on the supervisory boards of the NIFs and subse-
quently directing the funds to sign such contracts. Additionally,
the synergy effect from managing more than one fund allowed
the management firms to maximise their profits.
In the second part of the paper, focused on the management
system of the funds, the authors found that the main problem
connected with the management of the NIFs resulted from the
very complicated corporate governance structure of the funds.
The division of tasks, rights and obligations among the three
management organs (management boards, supervisory boards,
and contracted management firms) and the relations between
them and the State Treasury have been unclear from the begin-
ning. There was a confusing combination of subordinate and
superior roles of the management firms in this system, but the
main difficulties resulted from the ambiguous position of super-
visory boards, which acted both as corporate management
organs on the one hand and government representatives on the
other. Additionally, the members of the NIFs’ supervisory boards
often tried to interfere in the day-to-day management of the
funds. The State Treasury, in turn, was very active in influencing
all participants in the early stages of the NIF Program (using both
direct and indirect means for exercising such influence).
All these facts created a very confusing situation, in which
the mutual relations among the three NIF management organs
and the State Treasury had to be clarified day by day in practice,
often by the use of political power. This in turn caused many
conflicts and sometimes real battles, as well as disappointments
all round. Mutual blocking mechanisms in the corporate gover-
nance structure of the funds hindered any decisive activity on
the part of the fund management.
A second important factor bearing on the overall effects of
NIF privatisation consists in the number and contradictory def-
inition of tasks assigned to the funds. Including in these tasks
both the economic and financial restructuring of portfolio com-
panies and the privatisation and raising of the value of the NIFs’
assets made it difficult to realise all these goals simultaneously, at
least in the short or medium term. There was political pressure
from the State Treasury as well as from the trade unions of port-
folio companies to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation of the com-
panies. Often, there was also resistance from the portfolio com-
panies’ unions and management against radical restructuring. In
effect, the restructuring activities of the funds, insofar as they
extended beyond changes in the management boards of the
portfolio companies, had a rather soft and defensive character.
Privatisation activities of the funds were sometimes blocked by
the State Treasury. The Ministry felt responsible for the perfor-
mance of the program, and was especially interested in
"restructuring before privatisation." It therefore tried to set lim-
its on some of the activities of the fund managers, which were
directed toward quicker distribution of shares in portfolio com-
panies. Long lasting battles between the funds and the State
Treasury on the choice of "proper" strategies were endemic in
the early stage of the program, when the majority of shares
were in the hands of the state. 
Finally, it turned out that the NIF managers strongly pre-
ferred secondary privatisation (i.e., sale to other investors) as the
main method of restructuring the portfolio companies. On the
basis of the research, the authors suspect that other kinds of
restructuring were neither possible in this concrete systemic
context nor desirable. The impossibility was due to the huge
needs of the portfolio companies and the lack of financial means
and industrial restructuring know-how (the lack of "enterprise
doctors") at the fund level. And it was probably not desirable due
to the doubtful quality of the investment decisions, which would
likely be made by players so strongly driven by political forces. 
Analysing the costs of management firms services, the
authors found that their remuneration was from the beginning
set at a very high level, unjustified by the value of managed
assets. Additionally, it was clear that the fixed element of the
total fee (the annual flat cash fee) was too large relative to the
remuneration for financial performance (yearly and final),
potentially distorting the incentive system for fund managers.
The actual costs of management, moreover, far exceeded all
expectations. As of the end of 2000, the total amount spent on
management services in the NIFs exceeded the huge sum of
756 million PLN, equalling 42.4% of the entire capitalisation of
the funds. By the end of 2000, for example, one NIF had a ratio
of costs to capitalisation of 91.3%; in contrast, the only fund in
which this ratio did not exceed 15% was the only NIF that was
not run by a management firm. Moreover, the relative signifi-
cance of the fees for financial performance in the entire remu-
neration of the fund managers was remarkably low. 
This shows that the use of contracted management compa-
nies was very expensive business for the program. However, in
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the case of several management firms, strong efforts undertak-
en to privatise a large number of companies may explain their
management costs. Analysis of the ratio of management costs to
capitalisation of the funds shows clearly that the management
costs of the funds may soon consume the entire value of their
assets. The general conclusion is quite obvious – unless there is
an unusual growth in the price of fund shares or a radical reduc-
tion in managers’ fees, the management costs will exceed the
market value of the managed property. In this situation it is very
likely that the NIF Program will be concluded sooner than
planned (in 2005).
The next question that the authors tried to answer was
whether the NIF Program accelerated the privatisation process
in Poland, in comparing the privatisation efficiency – i.e., the
quantitative privatisation results – of the National Investment
Funds (NIFs) and the Ministry of the State Treasury. The "pri-
vatisation efficiency" measure used for both these institutions
was the ratio of companies privatised in each year, respectively,
to the pool of companies available for privatisation at their dis-
posal. The type of investor to whom companies were sold was
also taken into consideration. It turned out that the privatisation
efficiency (or speed) was much higher at the funds than at the
ministry. It was also showed that NIF efficiency, both in absolute
terms and relative to MST privatisation efficiency, reached a
peak in 1998. Since 1999, in which privatisation and bankruptcy
exceeded the critical amount equal to half of the companies held
by the NIFs, their privatisation efficiency has been decreasing,
possibly because of the internal and external barriers that
appeared in the program. 
In the next part of the paper the authors looked at the
reaction of the market prices of NIFs’ shares to the diffe-
rences in the privatisation activities of the funds. The analysis
of the correlation shows a very strong positive relationship
between the real price of a fund share on the one hand and
the number of companies sold to foreign investors. There is
also a positive correlation between the real price and the
number of companies quoted at the public market, the num-
ber of companies sold to domestic investors and the total
privatisation activity of funds. The authors conclude, there-
fore, that the capital market places a premium on funds
whose privatisation strategies put special emphasis on selling
companies to foreign investors and, to a lesser extent, selling
companies to domestic investors and quoting them on the
public markets. Finally, it seems that the capital market
rewards a high rate of privatisation activity, which is reflect-
ed in the higher prices of the funds’ shares.
With respect to the evolution of ownership structure of the
NIF portfolio companies themselves, it was found that as of
December 2000, over half of these companies (278) have
gained new investors, including companies quoted on the stock
exchange (27) or over-the-counter market (12). In addition, 78
companies were under bankruptcy or liquidation procedures
(of which nine have already been liquidated at the time of writ-
ing). In all, secondary privatisation has affected, in the authors’
estimation, 330 firms. Some of them have mixed structures; for
instance, part of the shares of a company with an active share-
holder may be traded on the stock exchange. In 57 firms, for-
eign investors have appeared. In 89 companies the State Trea-
sury share has been reduced to zero. Each NIF sold between 5
and 23 of its portfolio companies to investors. Of the 278 NIF
companies transferred to date, 91 were sold in 1999 and 2000.
On the whole, therefore, the authors did not observe a signifi-
cant acceleration in this area. All categories of investors partici-
pating in other types of privatisation in Poland are represented
among the new owners of the NIF companies. The most
numerous new owners are domestic strategic investors (large
domestic companies), who became shareholders in over 134
companies. The next, most numerous category of new owners
consists of foreign investors, who have taken over 57 firms. Indi-
vidual private owners took over 48 firms. Employees became
shareholders in 14 NIF companies.9 Finally, 25 companies were
publicly quoted (on the stock exchange and the over-the-
counter market). Among these publicly traded companies, 16
companies also have leading shareholders. 
To conclude this section, the authors turned their attention
to a more detailed examination of the ownership structure of
the NIF portfolio companies. According to these data, the con-
centration in the companies began to increase, more slowly
than in the funds, but remarkably. By the year 2000, the largest
shareholders were in near-absolute control in about one third of
the companies. 
With respect to the concentration of ownership stakes, on
the average, most strategic investors have gained absolute con-
trol (more than 50%) of the firms’ equity. Financial institutions
and other NIFs have, on average, about 33–35% of shares. The
employees, who were given special privileges in the Polish mass
privatisation, have acquired control of only a small number of
companies. It seems likely that the character of the secondary
ownership changes in the NIF companies provides some
promise for the development of their future potential. The struc-
ture of ownership emerging in these companies is different from
the structure that had been created in the pool of firms privatised
9 Given the fact that investors from this group are generally unable to provide the capital support necessary to these weak companies, the fact that
the participation of employee-owned companies in the secondary privatisation process has been so limited should be seen as fortunate.
by other methods in Poland, since in most cases new strategic
investors, who can be future agents of changes, have appeared.
One of the main research questions, to which the authors
are at this point only able to provide a partial answer, is the
extent to which the construction of this privatisation scheme
influenced the economic performance of the enterprises priva-
tised thereby. At this stage, it seems that the initial ownership
structure of the NIFs, the associated corporate governance
regime, the financial situation of the funds and their regulatory
environment have not motivated fund management to engage
in restructuring activities in enterprises, but have rather encour-
aged sales and liquidations. This tendency has been strength-
ened by the management incentive system existing at the NIF
level. At the same time, strong government influence has hin-
dered faster privatisation of the NIF portfolio companies and
the consolidation activities of the funds. The internal inconsis-
tency of the NIF system, together with the unfavourable condi-
tions on the capital market, unfavourable tax regulations and the
activist stance of the State Treasury, narrowed the scope of pos-
sible activities of the funds and might be among the main rea-
sons for the unsatisfactory results of this program. 
The next part of the paper deals with the economic perfor-
mance of NIF portfolio companies. The authors report that the
economic and financial performance of the NIF companies
deteriorated in the early stage of the program because of its
delay and the lack of restructuring activities during the waiting
phase. This resulted in a very sharp decline of all economic and
financial indicators of the whole NIF sector. Other systemic rea-
sons that were discussed above seem to have strengthened this
tendency. The authors discussed selected economic and finan-
cial indicators for the entire group of NIF portfolio companies
from 1991 to 1999, in comparison with other groups of Polish
firms, categorised by the character of their ownership. This
analysis gives little grounds for optimism. In 1995, profitability
fell rapidly, and the NIF group became unprofitable. Their per-
formance continued to deteriorate in each subsequent year
(with the exception of 1997).
In 1999 this group of Polish enterprises had the worst pro-
fitability of those presented in the analysis. Net profitability
started to decrease for the NIF companies in 1995 and never
recovered. Much better results were achieved in 1999 by other
groups of privatised enterprises, and even by State Treasury
companies. It is clear that the strategies of other investors in pri-
vatised enterprises were more effective in generating improve-
ments in companies than were the NIFs. The percentage of NIF
firms achieving profits was also one of the lowest, and was sys-
tematically declining. The entire financial analysis of NIF compa-
nies in comparison with other Polish companies leads the
authors to the conclusion that control by the funds has not
caused an improvement in the performance of the portfolio
companies which are in weak condition. 
In the final section of the paper the authors investigated the
financial situation of NIF companies that have undergone sec-
ondary ownership changes (i.e., have been sold entirely or par-
tially to new owners), using a database on individual companies
that they compiled. They then divided the NIF companies into
groups by the type of new owners emerging as a result of sec-
ondary ownership changes (domestic and foreign strategic
investors, private individuals, employees, companies quoted on
the stock exchange, and those companies in which National
Investment Fund continues to be the main owner). They addi-
tionally divided the firms that had undergone secondary owner-
ship changes into groups by the date of their sale, in order to
take into account the length of the period of influence of the
new owners on the enterprises. In analysing the economic indi-
cators and financial ratios they also took into account the num-
ber of the companies that have undergone bankruptcy or liqui-
dation in each ownership group.
Because of methodological problems described in the
paper, it was very difficult to find significant results from this
investigation. In a group of companies as large and diversified as
the NIF portfolio companies, given these methodological prob-
lems, the best measure of performance appears to be sales. The
ratio of sales in 1999 to sales in 1995 allowed the authors to
draw conclusions concerning the change in the companies’
financial and market situation during that period. They observed
the worst situation in companies sold to domestic individuals
and employees. The drastic drop in sales (ranging from 30 to
60% for the whole period) for these groups shows that they
experienced no positive effects of privatisation during that peri-
od. This result is supported by the fact that the highest per-
centage of companies which have entered bankruptcy or liqui-
dation is found in the group of companies sold to domestic indi-
viduals (of 40 such companies, 10 – or 25% – entered bank-
ruptcy or liquidation).
A significant decline was also experienced by companies
which were not sold by the NIFs (i.e., where the largest block
of shares still belongs to the leading NIF) and by companies
which were traded publicly (with the exception of two com-
panies which were only listed in 1999). Although at first glance
the status of these two groups of companies appears to be dif-
ferent, it turns out that from the point of view of ownership
control they are in similar situations. The largest block of
shares in a typical publicly traded company continues to be
held by the company’s leading NIF or is held by a large, dis-
persed group of shareholders. Thus, these companies contin-
ue to lack a strong outside investor who could bring them cap-
ital, know-how, etc. 
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The authors observed the smallest deterioration in
1995–1999 sales performance in the groups of companies
sold to domestic corporations and foreign investors in 1996
and 1997. The groups in which these surprisingly good indica-
tors are found are those which were sold relatively early.
Companies sold in 1998 (especially to foreign investors) had
much worse results. The worst figures are observed for com-
panies sold latest – in 1999 (these figures are comparable with
those for publicly traded companies and those which contin-
ue to be owned by the NIFs). The authors seem, therefore, to
have confirmed their hypothesis, that quick, efficiently organ-
ised privatisation and secondary privatisation help enterprises
to maintain or improve their economic and market standing.
The NIF Program, which in effect "privatised" the process of
privatisation of the portfolio companies, was a success only to
this extent in which it led to the rapid sale of medium-sized
and large companies to domestic corporations and foreign
investors, which helped those companies to at least maintain
their market position. However, the financial situation of small
companies sold cheaply to domestic individuals and employ-
ees, companies sold relatively late (1998–1999), and compa-
nies listed on the stock exchange is much worse and can be
ascribed to the lack of a strong investor over a relatively long
period of time. The results of this study seem to confirm the
hypothesis that the pace of secondary  privatisation (time effi-
ciency) and the quality of the investor taking part in it may
have more influence on its effects than the level of concentra-
tion of ownership.
4.4. Wholesale Privatisation in Poland
and the Czech Republic
In spite of the explicit objectives of wholesale privatisa-
tion, it was clear from the very beginning that the initial
ownership structure it created would not be a permanent
one. It was expected that with the development of market
institutions, and notably with the development of the sec-
ondary market for shares, it would evolve into more effec-
tive forms. 
The author stress, however, that it is not clear how to
assess the quality of wholesale privatisation or, more specifi-
cally, what could be considered as a "good" ownership struc-
ture. The usual benchmark is the concentrated ownership
structure, which is commonly considered as the most effi-
cient one. Dispersed ownership is generally viewed as ineffi-
cient, leading to insufficient monitoring of managers. Own-
ership concentrated in the hands of outsiders is, on the con-
trary, advocated as creating better conditions for monitoring
and facilitating the provision of capital. However, the authors
argue, the existing economic theory provides us with
ambiguous hypotheses concerning the impact of ownership
structure on firm performance. Concentrated ownership
may not always be the best solution. Firstly, it may play
against minority shareholders of the company, secondly it
may too strongly restrict managers and negatively affect
their initiative and incentives, thirdly it may be costly in com-
panies requiring very high capital because it increases risk for
the concentrated owner. Finally, in an indirect way, high con-
centration may negatively affect the informational role of the
stock market.
This discussion suggests that it may not be appropriate
to try to evaluate the effectiveness of wholesale privatisa-
tion taking concentrated ownership as a benchmark. If we
do not know what the characteristics of a "good" owner-
ship structure or "good" corporate governance system are,
the flexibility of the ownership structure may rather
appear as a virtue. It is important that the ownership
structure be able to adjust to the firm environment. It is
also interesting to look at the determinants of the owner-
ship structure. In other words, rather than considering
ownership structure as exogenous and given, and look at
its impact on firm performance, the authors see owner-
ship structure as endogenous and try to determine how it
adjusts to various constraints. 
Such perspective could be traced back to Coase. According
to Coase, the distribution of property rights has no effect on
economic efficiency, provided they are clearly defined and there
are no transaction costs, because people can organise their
transactions in ways that achieve efficient outcomes. A possible
consequence of such approach could be, that in order to assess
the efficiency of a privatisation strategy, we should be mainly
concerned with the extent to which the reallocation of proper-
ty rights takes place. 
The proponents of wholesale privatisation could claim
that their strategy relied on the Coase theorem. They
could argue that ownership structure does not matter;
what really matters is the possibility of freely reallocating
property rights. However, the Coasian result strongly
depends on the availability of contracting and re-contract-
ing opportunities, backed by an established legal system
and law enforcement. In particular, the process of evolu-
tion of ownership structure is closely related to the ease
with which the original owners can maximise their gains by
selling their shares (or claims) to other potential buyers.
Conditions of resale play a crucial role in enabling new out-
sider owners to gain ownership and control of firms by buy-
ing the claims of insiders.10
The impact of privatisation and ownership structure on firm
performance is difficult to identify as it obviously depends on a
number of factors characterising firm environment. We may
expect that strong complementarities exist between privatisation
and the quality of business environment, determined by such fac-
tors as institutional infrastructure (including law enforcement);
development of financial markets; degree of product market
competition; macroeconomic stability. For instance, in countries
in which the institutional environment is weak, privatisation may
not bring about expected effects. The fact that in CIS countries it
is more difficult than in CEE countries to identify the effect of pri-
vate property on firm performance (e.g. Djankov and Murrell,
2000) may precisely be attributed to the lack of some of these
necessary complementary factors which make privatisation
work.11 Given the particularities of the transition process, we
need to consider not only the determinants of ownership con-
centration identified in the studies of developed market
economies, but also examine transition-specific factors.
This paper aimed at investigating the evolution of ownership
structure in firms privatised through "wholesale" schemes in two
countries: the Czech Republic and Poland. 
The authors found that a significant evolution of ownership
structure has taken place in both countries. Not only has there
been a strong tendency towards the concentration of owner-
ship in fewer hands, but also a large-scale reallocation of own-
ership rights has taken place. In the Czech Republic, starting
from a highly dispersed ownership structure, the large majority
of companies have found a dominant shareholder. In nearly half
of them, the dominant shareholder owns more than 50% of
equity and has absolute control over the firm. In Poland, starting
from a particular ownership structure imposed by the privatisa-
tion program, the majority of companies involved in the scheme
have come out of NIFs’ control and have found dominant own-
ers, some 10% of them being foreign investors.
There has also been much flexibility in both schemes with a
significant reallocation of ownership claims between different
groups of shareholders. Other companies and individuals have
emerged as major dominant shareholders in both countries. In
Poland, employees took control in a couple of companies. After
the initial distribution of ownership claims, the ownership
evolved in response to various pressures and constraints char-
acterising firms’ environment. The conditions for the evolution
of ownership were, of course, not the same in both countries.
Despite a variety of shortcomings, at least in the Czech Repub-
lic, ownership still developed rapidly. Indeed, the concentration
of ownership in the Czech Republic may be a response to the
poor legal framework and the low level of protection of mino-
rity shareholders. 
Finally, in so far as the determinants of ownership concen-
tration is concerned, the results obtained by the authors are not
unambiguous. Observable factors alone are unable to explain in
a satisfactory way the variations in ownership concentration. In
some cases, controlling for industry fixed effects and firm fixed
effects, allows to significantly improve the quality of regressions.
But firm specific factors do not always appear significant. Do-
minant ownership at the beginning of the process seems to
result in the firms becoming more concentrated than firms that
did not have a dominant owner in the beginning of the period.
In particular, the probability of a group shareholders gaining
dominance over a firm, is closely linked to the dominant position
of that group at the start. 
Usually, the empirical literature looks at the impact of own-
ership on the firm’s performance. And usually this type of
approach is criticised because it does not take into account the
problem of endogeneity of ownership structure. In this paper,
we have taken ownership structure as endogenous and have
looked at its determinants. The results, however, are not unam-
biguous. There is a need to continue working on the specifica-
tion of the model used in order to track any endogeneity. If fur-
ther regressions do not confirm that ownership and perfor-
mance are determined both by unobserved fixed effects, then it
would be possible  to study the impact of ownership (especially
the ownership by different types of dominant shareholders) on
performance. Further work on the data set is expected to shed
some light on these vexing questions.
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restructuring than insider ownership, the important point is the ease with which the existing owners can transfer their ownership claims to others.
11 For the analysis of the complementarity between ownership and competition see Grosfeld and Tressel (2001).
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In this project we investigated the phenomenon of "sec-
ondary privatisation" (that is, the further evolution of the
ownership structures establishment as the result of initial
privatisation) in three transition economies (the Czech
Republic, Poland and Slovenia) in the years 1995–1999. Our
research covered companies that were privatised under
various privatisation schemes which established ownership
structures whose nature was heavily determined by privati-
sation policy rather than market forces. These included
employee buyout programs and mass privatisation pro-
grams in which all citizens were given rights to acquire
shares at prices significantly below market value.
To carry out this research, we collected data on large
groups of enterprises privatised by such methods (either entire
populations or representative samples) in all three countries.
These data covered changes in the ownership structures of the
companies, as well as their economic performance.
The research team analysed these data using various sta-
tistical and econometric methods. In spite of a number of
differences between the three countries, we believe the fol-
lowing generalisations can be made on the basis of the com-
mon factors in the experiences of the countries.
1. Our results show that in the majority of enterprises
privatised under mass privatisation schemes in which insi-
ders were not privileged, secondary privatisation processes
have taken place (that is, new owners have taken over).
Transfer of ownership to new owners in insider-owned
companies like the Polish employee-leased companies and
most privatised enterprises in Slovenia, however, remains
limited to a minority of such companies.
2. In almost all enterprises we witness a concentration of
ownership.
3. What is surprising in our results (given what seems to
be a fairly broad, albeit far from universal, agreement among
economists dealing with corporate governance, theory of
the firm, etc.) is that the aforementioned concentration
process is not accompanied by improvements in perfor-
mance. Only some of the companies in the Polish National
Investment Fund Program seem to exhibit such a relation-
ship, and this was a relatively small group of companies sold
by the funds relatively early in the program to strategic
(especially foreign) investors.
4. This result may be an indication that ownership evo-
lution is first and foremost an endogenous process which is
determined by, rather than determining, the economic per-
formance of the enterprise. It could, however, also simply
result from the short period of time which has elapsed
between the acquisition of the companies by their new
owners and the time of the research.
5. We believe that the type of owner is very important.
It seems that a detailed analysis of the identity of the new
strategic investors emerging in the secondary privatisation
process should be the subject of further research in this
area. Are they foreign or domestic? Do they come from the
same branch as the purchased enterprise (thereby repre-
senting examples of horizontal integration), or do they have
supplier or customer relationship with the acquired compa-
ny (thus constituting examples of vertical integration)? Are
they financial investors? What connections have they had
with the acquired firm in the past? What are the strategies
underlying their acquisitions? These are some of the ques-
tions we think will be very important in further research.
6. The regulatory and institutional environment of the
privatised enterprises is also crucial – as crucial for the suc-
cess of secondary privatisation as it was for that of initial pri-
vatisation. Does this environment impede the entry of new
owners, or does it facilitate their appearance in the priva-
tised companies? This is a very broad topic, which was dealt
with often and from various angles in our work, and we
believe that it, too, demands further, more systematic
research in the future. When the legal and regulatory sys-
tem, as well as the macroeconomic environment (in a broad
sense) are highly unfavourable, we observe either blockages
or pathologies in the secondary privatisation process, as a
result of which the end results of this process turn out to be
very different from those expected by reformers. Some of
these unexpected, pathological results include the creation
of monopolistic structures and the entrenchment of owners
5. Conclusion
who are unwilling and/or unable to make the changes nec-
essary to improve the economic viability of the companies. 
7. Poorly designed privatisation institutions do not fulfil the
roles assigned to them, but rather take on lives of their own
and begin to create new problems. A cardinal example can be
found in the investment and privatisation funds, which consti-
tute one of the central legacies, and the greatest problems,
created by the privatisation schemes we investigated in this
project. Emerging as a result of various mixtures of spontane-
ity and state design in all three countries, they were ori-ginal-
ly intended by the designers of privatisation policies to solve
the corporate governance problem in one of two ways. Either
they were to solve the problem (chiefly, the principal-agent
problem) of an enormous group of shareholders extending to
practically the entire population by concentrating managerial
control over the enterprises whose ownership was widely dis-
persed, or – quite the opposite – they were to quickly sell
their shares in companies, allowing for concentration of own-
ership to eliminate the principal-agent problem altogether.
They have lived up to neither expectation. They have had nei-
ther the capacity nor the motivation to engage in active cor-
porate governance, but became major player in the
economies of at least two of the three countries we studied.
Far from delivering improved corporate governance and com-
pany performance, they have often been used in schemes to
drain companies of their assets (most notoriously in the case
of the Czech Republic, whose experience gave rise to a new
element of financial terminology – tunnelling. Another impor-
tant institutional factor is the regulation of capital markets.
There has been much commentary on the poor regulation of
the Czech capital market and the high-quality regulation of the
Warsaw Stock Exchange, and it seems that the Slovenian
exchange bears a number of disturbing resemblance to the
one in Prague. These problems often reduce the transparen-
cy of the secondary privatisation process, creating difficulties
both in the raising of new capital by companies seeking it and
in the protection of the rights of minority shareholders.
8. The inertia of ownership structures frequently
observed in our samples is not accidental, but rather results
from the entrenchment of incumbent owners that emerged
in the primary privatisation process and frequently bar entry
to all outsiders. Since the state can no longer exercise influ-
ence on this situation from the position of an owner, it can
only act through the creation of new regulation, which could
at least partially reduce some of the barriers to entry.
Having commented on what we feel to be the common
denominators emerging from our research, we would now
like to comment on some of the differences between the
three countries studied, as well as some of the similarities
between various groups of companies studied.
The picture of the Slovenian situation presented here
bears much resemblance to the situation in Poland. Similar-
ities are especially striking with regard to the behaviour of
investment funds, managers and employees as owners in
the post-privatisation phase, as well as with respect to the
behaviour of the state (both as an owner and as a regulator).
In the case of the latter, both the Slovenian and the Polish
experience (for the latter, see the Polish paper on the
National Investment Funds) shows that it is difficult if not
impossible for the state to refrain from exercising the
power it reserved for itself in maintaining residual property
in the privatised enterprises, as well as via its influence in the
investment funds themselves. Both states have also shown a
tendency to make too many promises that they cannot
keep, and to try desperately to keep those promises by util-
ising privatisation revenues (which, ironically, gives the state
an incentive to keep as much residual property as possible,
in order to have a reserve from which it can deliver on such
promises).  In both Poland and Slovenia, generally speaking,
companies with more or less average performance became
employee owned, those with the best performance were
often sold in IPOs, and the weaker performers went into
the portfolios of investment funds via voucher privatisation.
Other similarities include:
1. The role of party politics in the exercise of influence
in the economy. Parties use their influence in various funds
and enterprises to provide their people and friends with
employment and sources of revenue.
2. The extraordinarily high costs (particularly in Poland
and Slovenia) of the social insurance system, as well as prob-
lems and delays in the reform of this system (leading to the
making of promises as described above, as well as the use
of privatisation revenues to make good on those promises).
It is worth mentioning here that in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary we observe a pattern of accelerating
privatisation of large companies in response to the growth
in the needs of the state budget associated with fiscal and/or
economic crises faced at various times in the 1990s. At the
same time, in none of those countries (with the possible
exception of Hungary, with the reform package introduced
by Lajos Bokros) have we observed a serious, successful
attempt to reform the structural causes of these fiscal prob-
lems (in fact, a number of Polish reforms in the late 1990s
increased these problems). As a result, these extraordinary
revenues from privatisation, which could have been used to
finance real reforms, have been largely wasted.
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3. In both Polish and Slovenian employee-owned com-
panies we have noted that problems seem to arise from the
fact that many people keep their shares after leaving com-
panies (due to retirement or other reasons), as well as due
to the fact that shares are often not available for new
employees hired after privatisation. The problems are due
to perceptions that the most consumption-oriented atti-
tudes are exhibited by former (and not current) employees,
and that new employees (young, well-educated persons
hired in the 1990s) are often the most valuable in the firm.
In both papers it has been suggested that it is possible that
employee-owned companies could gain certain advantages
from the creation of trust funds which would hold employ-
ee shares on behalf of the employees, issuing shares to new
employees and purchasing them from those that leave the
company. Such a mechanism might resemble, for example,
the Employee Stock Ownership Plans of the United States.
The Slovenian authors report that while a similar mecha-
nism has been introduced in Slovenia, it has not been availed
of in a significant number of companies, and point to the lack
of promotion of the mechanism via tax incentives. Howev-
er, tax incentives are not the only means of promoting this
sort of arrangement (and it is debatable whether they are a
desirable one)12. Public education campaigns and training
programs (e.g., for trade unionists) might well prove to be
sufficient in raising public awareness concerning the advan-
tages of such arrangements. 
On the other hand, some differences need to be men-
tioned as well. These are: 
1. Slovenian "employeeism". The heavy emphasis on
both codetermination (employee representation on super-
visory boards) and employee ownership in Slovenia was not
duplicated in any other transformation country. It seems
that Slovenia was unable to find an appropriate balance with
respect to the regulation of various forms of employee par-
ticipation, adjusting forms of participation not based on
ownership to the ownership situation in a given company.
2. The limited role of foreign investors in the Slovenian
economy. This strongly differentiates Slovenia from trans-
formation countries like Poland, Estonia, and Hungary (and
more recently – following the conclusion of voucher privati-
sation – the Czech Republic). Perhaps in the 1990s, due to
the Slovenia’s GDP per capita being much higher than in
other transformation countries, Slovenes felt they could
afford this. One can expect, however, that a failure to open
the country more will have increasingly severe adverse
effects. At any rate, such opening will be made necessary by
the process of accession to the European Union.
In terms of policy recommendations from this research,
we suggest the following:
1. "Optimal" ownership structures in privatised enter-
prises cannot be identified ex ante. Therefore, the most
important task is to assure the flexibility of initial ownership
structures, guaranteeing to the maximum extent possible
the ability of interested actors to adjust those structures to
the environment through re-allocation of property rights. 
2. This flexibility depends on the ease of contracting and
re-contracting, backed by an established legal system and
law enforcement. In the case of privatised enterprises it is
important to ensure that the privatisation scheme will not
block future re-allocation of ownership rights by providing
selected groups of owners with privileged position.
3. Institutional factors (some of them specific to transi-
tion countries), such as contract law enforcement, develop-
ment and transparent regulation of financial markets, degree
of product market competition, and hard budget constraints
in a stable macro-economic environment, are necessary for
privatisation (both primary and secondary) to bring about
expected effects. 
4. Special privatisation institutions tend to acquire func-
tions extending beyond their originally intended roles, taking
on lives of their own. Therefore, special care in their design
(including, for example, establishment of explicit time limits
for the period of their activity in the case of relevant mi-
nistries or agencies) is suggested. 
5. Wholesale or mass privatisation, because of its transi-
tional nature, is not expected to establish "real" owners for
the companies but only temporary owners. Hence, it may be
inappropriate to evaluate the effects of this kind of privatisa-
tion taking the outcomes of its first stage as a benchmark.
The speed and quality of the secondary privatisation of those
enterprises are more important for this assessment.
6. The temporary owners should be assessed on the basis
of their "agent-seller" effect rather than their "owner" (restruc-
turing) effect on enterprises. This means that the quality of
mass privatisation should be measured by the speed at which
investment funds find new owners for the companies and by
the positive influence of these new owners on the perfor-
mance effects of companies, rather than the effects of the
funds themselves on company performance. 
12 Certain tax incentives might be advisable in the case of the use of employee stock options as a form of retirement insurance, but this would have
to be part of a comprehensive pension reform.
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